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Abstract 
My paper addresses the following questions: can MERCOSUR achieve the goal of creating a common 
market that implies free movement without resorting to governance instruments that require supranational 
institutions? Can the Mutual Recognition (MR) instrument resolve the problem of divergent 
standards? Further, in the case of MERCOSUR, can it really be considered a non-supranational 
governance instrument? In the next sections, I define a common market under a Regional Integration 
Agreement (RIA), I then address the relationship between standards, technical barriers, and the 
integration of goods markets, especially in view of the potential trade-off between liberalization and 
heterogeneity. Finally, I consider the possibility of building a MERCOSUR common market without 
supranational institutions. 
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Construcción del mercado común del MERCOSUR: armonización y 
(o) reconocimiento mutuo de reglas 
 
Resumen 
Mi documento aborda las siguientes preguntas: ¿puede el MERCOSUR lograr el objetivo de crear un 
mercado común que implique la libre circulación sin recurrir a instrumentos de gobernanza que requieren 
instituciones supranacionales? ¿Puede el reconocimiento mutuo (MR) resolver el problema de normas 
divergentes? Además, en el caso del MERCOSUR ¿realmente se lo puede considerar como un 
instrumento de gobierno no-supranacional? En las siguientes secciones, defino un mercado común bajo 
un Acuerdo de Integración Regional (RIA), luego abordo la relación entre normas, barreras técnicas, y la 
integración de mercado de bienes, especialmente en vista del posible intercambio entre liberalización y 
heterogeneidad. Finalmente, considero la posibilidad de construir un mercado común del MERCOSUR 
sin instituciones supranacionales. 
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Introduction 
The MERCOSUR integration process can be usefully compared with the equivalent 
European process insofar as pursuing the same objectives, particularly the construction of a 
common market, albeit through substantially different processes. This therefore constitutes an 
important case study to assess the different forms of integration of European markets when 
compared to Latin American markets. 
After all, MERCOSUR scholars and politicians have always referred to the substantial 
difference between the European integration method and that of MERCOSUR integration, 
which rejects the use of supranational solutions based on the rule of law in favour of forms of 
intergovernmental cooperation. 
Important to recall first are the definitions: the official MERCOSUR documents speak 
of the formation of a common market promoting only free trade but the “free movement of 
goods, services, and factors of production between countries”, and hence beyond the mere 
liberalization of domestic markets1.This implies a higher degree or “deep” integration entailing 
not only the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, but also defining a new system of law 
and order for establishing rules and their enforcement, i.e., a constitutional change. This, 
however, according to the notions formerly expressed, must be achieved without assigning 
sovereignty.  
In the economic literature dedicated to the issue of the removal of technical barriers to 
trade (TBT), the possibility of replacing the instrument laying down common rules, whereby 
regional institutions require a high degree of supranationality, with that of the mutual 
recognition of national rules, is often supported and deemed more flexible and, above all, more 
suitable to agreements that do not entail ceding national sovereignty. 
My paper thus addresses the following questions: can MERCOSUR achieve the goal of 
creating a common market that implies free movement without resorting to governance 
instruments that require supranational institutions? Can the Mutual Recognition (MR) 
instrument resolve the problem of divergent standards? Further, in the case of MERCOSUR, 
can it really be considered a non-supranational governance instrument? In the next sections, we 
define a common market under a Regional Integration Agreement (RIA). I then address the 
relationship between standards, technical barriers, and the integration of goods markets, 
especially in view of the potential trade-off  between liberalization and heterogeneity. Finally, I 
consider the possibility of building a MERCOSUR common market without supranational 
institutions. 
 
1 - Building the common market under a RIA 
What are the design features that characterise a common market? The EU’s experience 
has at times been regarded as a template for other regional bodies throughout the world, and this 
has often hampered the comparative analyses of the formation of common markets by confusing 
the study of European integration with the study of economic regionalism, itself a sub-set of the 
broader study of European integration. In other words, in an Eurocentric view, the European 
Union (EU) is often considered the universal model for the construction of a domestic market 
                                                             
1 The difference between “free trade” and “free movement” is explained by Pelkmans (2007: 700): 
“….free movement is much more compelling and far-reaching than ‘free trade’. Under free trade, a 
country agrees not to impose (say) tariffs and quotas under an international treaty, so it is ‘bound’ in that 
respect but remains autonomous otherwise. ….. Free movement, however, forces the country into a 
different position: the right of market access (here, inside the EU) is not negotiable but guaranteed as 
such, and the country can only deviate by explicit derogations as specified in the treaty or European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) case law”. 
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measuring the success (or failure) of other Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) by way of 
their proximity to (or remoteness from) the European model.  
Indeed, much of the scholarly literature on international cooperation regards those 
regional agreements characterised by a single efficient solution to the problems of the 
interaction of states as less than sufficient (for example, Garrett and Weingast, 1993). 
Functional type approaches based solely on identifying the most efficient solution or on 
assessing the national interests of states cannot, however, provide valid explanations for 
international cooperation applied in a comparative context across regions. Although these types 
of analyses can confirm ex post whether the solutions identified are efficient, they cannot 
explain why these particular solutions were chosen. 
Garrett (1992) in his analysis of the EU internal market notes that numerous empirical 
studies indicate that there may be many different solutions to the need for inter-state cooperation 
in a regional body, and that none can be considered as generally valid. These studies can hence 
be synthesised with the “folk theorem” in non-cooperative game theory, which emphasizes that 
in repeated games with non-superficial information, infinite solutions can be sustained in 
equilibrium, including those that are not on the Pareto-optimality frontier. This implies that the 
assessment of cooperative solutions to a problem, such as the construction of a common market, 
requires considering not only one optimal solution, but many possible solutions. Further, the 
impact of redistributive power and asymmetries cannot be underestimated, nor the importance 
of ideas, social norms, institutions, and shared expectations in the search for, and choice of, a 
common solution (Garrett and Weingast, 1993; Murray and Warleigh-Lack, 2013).  
Thus, different solutions to the task of constructing a common market need to be 
considered. In any case, what constitutes a common market under a RIA must first be defined. 
In a traditional economic perspective, the prevalent conceptual approach indicates the 
market as a place of economic transactions to improve consumer welfare - the catallaxy game in 
Hayek’s (1976) version - through the optimal allocation of resources or rationalizing their use 
by means of competition. If this concept is extended to the case of a single market regional 
agreement, the standard definition refers to the verification of the law of one price, whose 
conditions are the presence of competition policies and full information for buyers and sellers 
(Flam, 1992). In this view, the formation of a regional market becomes a “simple” exercise of 
deregulation, i.e., eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers and monitoring the compliance of 
participating States to the commitment. 
By contrast, economic theory in the institutionalist and constitutionalist tradition, 
political science, and economic sociology have long dealt with issues relating to market 
building, particularly with regard to facilitating economic transactions through rule-making and 
law enforcement. One of the basic arguments of institutionalist theory is the link between 
politics and markets: a market economy cannot exist in a vacuum (Boettke et al., 2005), but is 
embedded in a broader set of institutions. 
Markets cannot exist without rules enabling economic transactions - property rights, 
rules on contracts, product and production process standards, and so forth. The goodness of 
these rules (institutions) determines an economy’s growth capacity (Acemoglu, 2005) and is in 
turn determined by the quality of the relationships formed between the rules, the government 
organizations and the economic actors (North, 1990). In this way, even large differences that 
exist in the economic performance of different countries can be explained taking into account 
the differences in their institutional structure. 
The formation of markets thus understood – as exchanges regulated by an institutional 
system - has been the subject of numerous studies in various social science disciplines. 
In the socio-political sphere, for example, Fligsteinand Stone Sweey(2002) argue that 
the link between markets and political authorities encourage economic development on the 
extent that this is linked to the emergence and consolidation of a particular symbiotic 
relationship among rule formation structures, government organizations and economic actors. 
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Appropriate types of governance, institutions and enforcement mechanisms promote economic 
development while bad institutional choices probably lead to forms of rent seeking by 
companies or public operators. This mechanism is evolutionary, in the sense that an increase in 
trade, as can occur in an international or inter-regional context, pushes traders to demand more 
rules and greater governance capacity. New institutions therefore change the way in which 
businesses and other actors are organized and interact. 
Beckert (2009:247) intends market exchange as “a form of social interaction that can be 
explained… only by the institutional structures, social networks, and horizons of meaning 
within which market actors meet”. The author considers that the task of economic sociology is 
to explain the terms of coordination, i.e., the possibility for actors to align “their actions in ways 
that allow for market exchange to take place”, possibilities deriving from the fact that 
expectations can be formed about the behaviour of the other actors, considered sufficiently 
compatible with their material interests and ideals. 
Duina (2006) in his analysis of the social construction of the market in the EU, NAFTA, 
and MERCOSUR investigates how markets have been built taking into account the ability of 
participants to share cognitive notions, especially in the area of property rights. 
Remaining within the institutionalist framework, economists drawing on this inspiration 
assume the obvious presence of transaction costs where the market must be understood as “a 
social arrangement that facilitates repeated exchange among a plurality of parties” (Furubotn 
and Richter, 2003: 284). The market is thus intended as an organization that consists of a set of 
institutional rules in addition to those who create and apply these rules. The objective is to 
obtain higher utility levels than those possible in the absence of any type of rule. Furubotn and 
Richter indicate that ultimately the market is able to organize contacts between parties due to 
the existence of a system of formal and informal rules (institutions) that govern transactions, 
specifically in the search, inspection, contracting, execution, control and enforcement stages. 
The rules are implemented collectively and through bilateral initiatives. Market efficiency thus 
depends on the costs incurred in “... setting up, maintaining and changing the organization 
market” (Furubotn and Richter, 2003: 284) and these costs can be attributed to the market but 
also to political transactions. Institutionalist inspired economists therefore resume the concept of 
the market as a “social construct” and consider, in addition to rules in the strict sense, the 
investments to promote relations among individuals, namely, to strengthen the relational culture 
(or mutual trust).  
These analyses therefore – in contrast to standard economics – enable us to explain how 
a market and a polity (or regional political entity such as MERCOSUR) is simultaneously built. 
Recalling the importance of institutions, rules, and relational investments leads to 
considering the need for a legal order as a meant of identifying a market. Important for our 
purposes is therefore Hadfield and Weingast’s (2012, 2013) suggestion that an environment (a 
market) can be considered as organized according to a legal order if: 
- There is an identifiable entity (an institution) that deliberately supplies a normativa 
classification scheme that designates some actions as “wrongful”. 
- Actors, due to the classification scheme, forego wrongful actions to a significant extent. 
Economic analyses on the formation of markets tend to recognize that the main task of 
institutions is the same over time and space, namely, to ensure respect for property rights and 
make credible the threat of pursuing those that do not respect them. However, even if the 
objectives are constant, the appropriate institutions may vary with alternative law enforcement 
strategies. 
In evaluating the case of MERCOSUR, this observation enables us to avoid 
comparisons that are based on the use of the European integration experience as a benchmark. 
Rather, we rely on the assumption that a shared goal, such as the construction of a common 
market, can be achieved with different solutions that consider the starting point of participating 
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states. As Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) underline, different institutions in different circumstances 
can provide the solution to the perceived need for a single market and the basic issue of market 
regulation, namely, the protection of property rights. However, recognizing that there may be 
different solutions to the same problem does not mean that all solutions can be adapted to the 
established objective. 
Clearly, building a common market under a RIA is a very complex problem, since a 
RIA: 
a) Creates a new market starting from existing market organizations, in the sense of 
Furubotn and Richter (2003), or more precisely, creates a new organization capable of 
producing new market transaction organizational rules. 
b) Is implemented between different countries, thus creating the problem of making a new 
efficient choice or limited to a transplantation of law. 
c) Therefore, the ability to change the institutions is essential. 
We intend to consider this problem from a particular point of view: the official 
MERCOSUR documents speak of the formation of a common market, which implies free 
movement, and not only free trade, and hence beyond the mere liberalization of domestic 
markets. This implies a higher degree or “deep” integration entailing not only the elimination of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers, but also defining a new system of law and order for establishing 
rules and their enforcement. In our view, the fundamental difference with the EU is in the 
common market definition: 
-  in the EU, the common market (now the internal market) is “an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaties” (Article 26 of the Treaty on the functioning of 
the EU). 
-  in MERCOSUR, according to the Treaty of Asunción, Art. 1: “The States Parties hereby 
decide to establish a common market, which shall be in place by 31 December 1994 and shall 
be called the ‘common market of the southern cone’ (MERCOSUR). This common market shall 
involve: the free movement of goods, services and factors of production between countries 
through, inter alia, the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff restrictions on the movement 
of goods, and any other equivalent measures”. 
To note is the difference with the European definition, which calls for both the absence 
of borders and the “guarantee” of free movement. This implies the transition from the notion of 
a common market to that of single or internal market, a step linked to the creation of a common 
system of rules based on supranational institutions. In the case of MERCOSUR, the Treaty 
limits itself to a definition that does not imply guarantees for economic operators or 
commitments for states, while the goal of free movement is entrusted to intergovernmental type 
agreements. 
 
2 - Regional liberalization and standards 
The elimination of non-tariff barriers – the crux of any attempt to create a regional 
common market - has long been the focus of public and private operators with substantial 
consensus on the need to reach agreement on standards, namely, the rules governing the 
production and marketing of goods and services, and the regulation of input factor markets. 
Why seek an agreement on standards, particularly in MERCOSUR? 
The nature of the public good of standards (understood according to theory as non-
privately appropriable goods whose consumption is non-divisible) entails some particularly 
important consequences for our problem in terms of the link with regional integration. The fact 
that standards are shared by a community, generally national, since they guarantee the 
achievement of common goals, indicates their clear association with the characteristics of the 
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community itself: preferences, habits, technological skills, levels of quality of life, cultural 
traditions. 
Given that communities may greatly differ, this implies the absence of any supposition 
that the regulations must be the same. A further consequence is that the endogenous nature of 
the regulations can only change when the fundamental characteristics of the communities that 
have expressed them also change. This therefore points to the need for communities 
participating in a RIA being sufficiently homogeneous. 
International trade plays an important role here: trade openness can substantially change 
the characteristics of a community, for example, by modifying spending capacities, production 
models, and income distribution, and thus indirectly contributing to the change of the 
regulations sought. Likewise, the international opening of a country may allow the influx of 
information - for example, the most innovative technologies available to resolve a problem 
addressed by national regulations - that was previously unavailable, and thus overcoming 
another important factor, namely, the information gap that may at times be the source of 
regulatory differences. 
This consideration entails the need to make a clear distinction between the existence of 
different regulations - which, considering public goods theory is absolutely rational - and the 
strategic use of the same regulations, which conversely may lead to distortions in the allocation 
of resources and therefore an inefficient outcome. These are two distinct issues at the logical 
level: the difference in market regulations between different communities when also effectively 
reflecting a difference in the characteristics and preferences of citizens does not only lead to 
distortions in the international system, but is precisely the means of impeding them. Conversely, 
imposing the same regulations in substantially different countries can lead to a distorted use of 
resources. 
In other words, the heterogeneity of regulations has very different consequences for 
international trade in relation to the reasons that determined it. According to Sykes (1996), 
“good” heterogeneity, derives from differences in people's tastes, preferences, and incomes. For 
example, a national community that has had to bear the weighty costs of the failure of financial 
institutions demands higher banking or insurance regulations than others, in the same way as 
another community that has relatively low-income levels is less willing than others to bear the 
costs of rigid regulations on the quality or safety of products. The income distribution within a 
community can itself be the source of heterogeneity: if the preferences for regulations are 
expressed by the “average” constituent, a community characterized by an egalitarian distribution 
of income will tend to show preferences for rules that protect health or safety compared to those 
expressed by a community characterized by highly concentrated income distribution. Many of 
these differences can be justified, as stated before, with reasons linked to efficiency, but even 
when such reasons cannot be applied, democratic legitimacy is also a sufficient justification. 
The discourse changes when the causes of heterogeneity are not found in these types of 
reasons, but are merely causal factors or related to government deficiencies. In other words, 
regulations can only be approved based on traditions without any reference to preferences or 
income levels, or when sufficient government information is lacking, for example, on new 
technologies available to achieve a particular result of public interest. In this case, defending 
support for the differences between national regulations is more difficult, especially when they 
result in additional costs for international trade. 
“Bad” heterogeneity raises even more doubts due to organized interest groups 
“capturing” the regulations, such as those easily constituted in heavily regulated sectors and 
which find precisely in the regulations an important trade defence instrument. Such a situation 
may give rise to rules with explicit discriminatory content, harming foreign competitors, and 
formally non-discriminatory rules, which may equally create differences to the detriment of 
competitors. According to the theory of international trade, rules that explicitly or otherwise 
have discriminatory intent reduce social welfare in the same way as traditional trade defence 
instruments. 
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Therefore, “good” heterogeneity appears to be largely justified and, indeed, is the 
source of differences between countries that determine the trade benefits. Conversely, 
differences arising for other reasons may be undesirable, and should therefore be eliminated in 
an ideal world. Of course, the call for the international harmonization of internal regulations 
cannot only consider the reasons for heterogeneity, but must also consider the role attributed to 
the regulations in relation to international trade. Indeed, even in the face of the second type of 
justification for regulatory differences, if they do not involve costs for international trade, but 
only for those countries that apply them, there would seem to be no rational reasons to link trade 
liberalization to harmonization. 
Abbott and Snidal (2001) seek to address the complexity of the matter by providing first 
a definition and taxonomy of the different types of standards, which is very important to 
understand the problems associated with solving this problem and choosing the requisite forms 
of governance to deal with them. The definition of standards as “a guide for behaviour and for 
judging behaviour” (Abbott and Snidal, 2001:345) is broad enough to consider very different 
situations, all of which can affect a regional agreement. Consider, for instance, the standards 
designed to regulate products and production processes, but also those aimed at regulating 
factor markets, or rules for the production of public goods (environmental protection, 
etc.). Likewise, the authors define international governance as “the formal and informal bundles 
of rules, roles and relationships that define and regulate the social practices of state and non-
state actors in international affairs. Standards and the institutions associated with them are 
subcategories of governance” (Abbott and Snidal, 2001:346). 
These definitions may clarify the complexity of problems related to resolving the 
externalities created by the difference between national standards. Externalities, which may 
manifest when an actor's behaviour affects the welfare of others, require adopting the necessary 
standards in an economic perspective to improve the efficiency of a market system. However, as 
we previously pointed out, a possible trade-off exists between the need for standards compatible 
with market integration and the different preferences (and regulatory capacity) of participating 
countries. 
This complexity ultimately makes it particularly difficult to choose the desired 
governance systems in a RIA considering both the different problems and the different 
preferences. 
Returning to Abbott and Snidal (2001) for a deeper insight into this topic, identifying a 
taxonomy that enables expediently classifying the standards to discuss their role in regional 
integration processes is useful. These authors suggest considering the differences between the 
standards depending on whether they entail coordination or cooperation games. 
The first case involves standards related to technological or transactional 
interconnectivity issues, which normally favour common standards even if countries cannot 
agree on which standards to choose. In the second case, we can include standards applied to 
resolving physical externalities (such as environmental issues) or policies (for example, 
regulating factor markets): cooperative games prevail here, since individual countries may find 
it expedient to adopt their own standards, possibly conflicting with those of other countries, and 
only through cooperation - when the opportunity is recognized - it is possible to reconcile the 
standards with international trade. 
Naturally, coordination or cooperation games may require different international 
governance solutions, and those normally discussed vary widely, ranging from pure competition 
to the extreme opposite of uniform and common regulations. 
 
3 - TBT and MERCOSUR 
TBTs in MERCOSUR have a significant impact on the level of well-being of member 
countries. A recent UNCTAD (2016) study reported that the impact of TBTs is significantly 
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higher than the impact of traditional Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) - quotas, price controls, etc. -, 
causing prices to increase by 10-15% in Argentina and Brazil, and 10% in other countries. The 
need for the convergence of regulations therefore seems evident. UNCTAD also indicates that 
such convergence can create significant well-being gains: the adopted Computable General 
Equilibrium model signals a gain attributable to deeper regional integration, equal to an increase 
of two billion US $, also considering the losses due to the national governments renouncing the 
revenues obtained through NTBs. 
Similar to other regional agreements, decisions regarding TBT and sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards (SPS) adopted in MERCOSUR refer to the rules established by the 
WTO Agreements. 
In fact, both in Resolution 60/93, relating to SPS, and in Decision 45/17, concerning 
technical barriers, the basic principle is to adopt the WTO Agreements as a basis for decisions. 
In the case of SPS, the resolution is dedicated both to establishing the principles, objectives, and 
criteria for the adoption of measures, and to indicate the parameters to be used for the 
equivalence of such rules. These parameters include those of the Codex Alimentarius and the 
World Organization for Animal Health. In the case of TBT, the MERCOSUR countries decided 
to establish an internal program for the reduction of technical barriers through the 
harmonization of national rules and the mutual recognition of the conformity assessment 
processes. Again, both the definitions and the contents of the rules must be established 
considering the general rules and principles of the WTO TBT Agreement. This decision offers a 
minimum level of security to commercial transactions, given that if a country adopts an 
internationally recognized standard, the TBT Agreement prevents recipient countries from 
erecting technical barriers to trade. On the other hand, in addition to accepting the institutional 
weakness of the WTO Agreements, it also entails the substantial waiver of regional norms 
typical of MERCOSUR. 
In fact, the “original” part of the MERCOSUR decisions is procedural in nature, i.e., 
how to adopt, when deemed necessary, the MERCOSUR technical standards. Decision 45/17, 
which replaced the previous 56/02, is rather precise in this regard, and indicates a complex 
decision-making process that starts from a Member State's proposal and passes to the specific 
working subgroup (SGT), and from here to the Common Market Group (GMC), which must 
take the final decision. The process then entails incorporating the law into the national legal 
system, and as known, the rules come into force after incorporation by national institutions only 
in Brazil, while in other member countries, they come into force only after all members have 
incorporated the rules.  
In the event of a subsequent dispute, the MERCOSUR countries then have different 
dispute resolution options, either through the settlement mechanism envisaged by the founding 
treaty or through the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms. 
From reading the rules and their subsequent application, the following emerges: 
- MERCOSUR expects to solve the problem of the elimination of TBTs through the 
harmonization of national rules that must take place according to the procedure set out in 
Resolution 45/17. The innovation brought about by this last resolution consists mainly in the 
commitment of member countries to oppose the MERCOSUR standards only for technical 
reasons. The mutual recognition mechanism, in turn, is reserved only for the conformity 
assessment procedures. 
- The adoption of common rules is very complex and slow, and in any case does not offer 
economic operators guarantees or respect of the adoption. Numerous analyses indicate that 
many years after adoption by the GMC, most of the harmonized rules have not been 
incorporated by Member States. Furthermore, the preferred procedures for resolving disputes 
are direct negotiations between governments rather than the intervention of the Permanent 
Review Court. In any case, the lack of a supranational institution able to establish the correct 
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interpretation of the rules, which is left to national courts, provides no guarantees of the 
commitment to eliminate technical barriers. 
- A large part of the work, especially in elaborating the harmonized common rules, is 
entrusted to national technical bodies, and therefore depends on their technical and institutional 
quality. Prado and Bertrand (2015) indicate that relying on national regulatory bodies has 
proved to be the main obstacle to the harmonization process, but as we shall see, it also prevents 
the use of forms considered less demanding than TBTs, such as the mutual recognition of 
national rules. 
Indeed the MERCOSUR experience to date does not seem to meet the requirements. 
The GMC cannot be deemed an authoritative steward, considering that, at most, it can offer 
proposals or informal recommendations, and is not regarded as a political but a purely 
functional organ. Decisions are made by consensus, which means that negotiations must 
continue until an agreement is reached, often accompanied by high levels of ambiguity. 
The dispute resolution instruments are not mandatory though, at least formally; 
however, when used, they produce final and binding decisions. Nevertheless, states can 
negotiate suspension measures with other parties to the litigation, thus not creating interpretative 
certainty. 
The operational and institutional difficulties associated with these attempts to 
harmonize national rules through the production of MERCOSUR rules have led, in some cases, 
to following different paths. The main path, in the case of both TBT and SPS, is that of private 
agreements. At least in theory, this is a very interesting experiment, namely, the possibility of 
creating a market without a traditional rule of law. In this regard, useful to recall are the 
indications of Hadfield and Weingast (2012, 2013) that an environment (a market) can be 
considered as organized according to a legal order, which could be envisaged in particular 
circumstances. “There is an identifiable entity that serves as an authoritative steward of a 
unique, clear, and non-contradictory normative classification that is prospective and reasonably 
stable. This classification must be public and common knowledge. It must enable ordinary 
individuals to predict reasonably well the classifications that the system will reach through the 
use of impersonal, neutral, and independent reasoning to extend generalizable classifications to 
specific and novel circumstances”. 
To achieve this, the institution tasked with coordinating the legal order must facilitate 
the integration of knowledge and ways of reasoning of each individual (state) in a generalized 
and sufficiently universal way to be able to serve the interests and needs of all of those who play 
an important role in its decentralized enforcement. Further, individuals (states) must perceive 
that belonging to such a coordination mechanism increases their wellbeing. 
Is it possible that this identifiable entity is of a private nature? In the case of 
MERCOSUR, is a legal order conceivable that is not necessarily defined by the presence of a 
“centralized enforcement body” but can exist -under the conditions that we shall highlight- even 
in the absence of a central government but with the power of enforcement?  
Under these conditions, is the effective implementation of the internal market 
achievable? Is it possible for MERCOSUR to achieve within the existing institutional 
framework a common market that is based on the rule of law but without a centralized structure 
of rules and their coercion and enforcement mechanisms? 
The question can be answered thus: it is possible to envisage a non-centralized lawful 
order if an institution can be created that is able to choose from a list of universally recognizable 
rules of conduct and where the incentive to respect a behaviour that the classification deems not 
wrongful is that of not incurring a penalty. However, the ability to impose a penalty should not 
necessarily be attributed to this or another centralized institution. Hadfield and Weingast 
(2013:8) consider this to be “a form of collective punishment whereby delivery of an effective 
penalty depends on independent and simultaneous decisions made by individual (non-official) 
actors to punish a wrongdoer”. 
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From this perspective, the functioning of the known mechanisms of decentralized 
collective punishment (loss of reputation, retaliation, shame, ostracism, or suchlike) leads us to 
the central question regarding coordination among different countries for a common 
interpretation of the rules and a common assessment of the need for punishment. The existence 
of a legal institution that can produce a common classification of the conduct of an individual 
(state) as wrong or right reduces ambiguity and makes the coordination of collective punishment 
possible. 
Clearly an approach based on private, nongovernmental enforcement, is appropriate 
when the interaction between the parties is continuous and repetitive. 
In MERCOSUR, several examples of rule integration processes, largely outside 
government agreements, are recalled. Bruszt and McDermott (2014) present two studies 
dedicated to the automotive (Costa and Jacoby, 2014) and agricultural sector (Lengyel and 
Delich, 2014), both characterized by a “private” initiative that interacts with the public 
initiative. 
In the case of the automotive sector, the initiative was mainly in the hands of the 
multinationals that identified solutions to propose to their governments through the bodies 
representing their interests (and therefore without attention to the distribution of benefits). The 
regional solution took place thanks to the “private” talks between the national associations of 
the MERCOSUR countries that then simultaneously transmitted their joint proposals to their 
governments. This system enabled overcoming the absence of a supranational authority, 
creating a regional structure that made it possible to overcome the divisions that emerged at the 
intergovernmental level. 
Naturally, this solution is limited to a productive sector that, albeit in the absence of a 
formal regional rule capable of favouring the implementation and possible resolution of 
disputes, keeps the agreements weak and subject to economic and political pressures, especially 
in periods of economic difficulty. Costa and Jacoby (2014) recall, for example, that in 2011, 
private agreements were strongly hampered by the disputes between the governments of 
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay that led to new trade barriers in the automobile sector. 
A similar situation occurred in the agri-food sector, where the trend towards the growth 
of voluntary private standards is affirming globally, especially in the markets of developed 
countries (Lengyel and Delich, 2014). Of course, there is also a tendency to adapt to this private 
approach in the MERCOSUR countries, especially in exporting countries. The authors highlight 
that the economic operators in the sector appreciate the greater access to markets, the 
improvement of production quality, the greater attention to environmental issues, but are also 
concerned about the costs of adjustment and the difficult harmonization of the SPS themselves. 
Lengyel and Delich (2014) report the heterogeneity of behaviour both in Argentina and, 
more generally, in MERCOSUR, as regards the SPS of products most linked to international 
trade, where the quality of standards is very important, namely, fresh fruit (apples and pears in 
particular), rice, and lemons, and their different commercial performances. 
An in-depth analysis of individual cases leads to the indication that the success in 
adopting private standards depends on the quality of public-private cooperation, above all to 
guarantee the dynamic of continuous product quality improvements. This makes it very difficult 
in MERCOSUR to achieve the reduction of trade barriers through the voluntary adoption of 
sufficiently homogeneous SPS. The profound differences between member countries with 
respect to the ability to manage this public/private relationship signal the difficulty of creating a 
unified institutional apparatus at the regional level. 
The interesting conclusion of the two authors is that the main task of MERCOSUR, in 
this specific case, is not so much harmonizing the existing public or private rules, but 
implementing an experimentation space, and therefore accumulating common knowledge that 
"from below" leads to reducing differences and strengthening product innovation capacity. 
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4- Alternatives to harmonization: mutual recognition 
As we have seen, full harmonization appears not only technically and politically more 
difficult, but in many cases is less appropriate, as we previously pointed out in terms of 
heterogeneity. 
We have seen that the harmonization attempts managed at the intergovernmental level 
or with the support of private economic operators are equally very difficult and do not represent 
a credible solution to the problem. 
Even in MERCOSUR, therefore, alternatives to harmonization may be preferable. 
Which alternatives are viable in MERCOSUR? 
The governance form that can take these observations into account could be – in the 
OCDE classification - the “Mutual Recognition” (MR) of national rules or the Mutual 
Recognition Agreements (MRA) observing the competence of “conformity assessment bodies”. 
MR has recently gained a great deal of attention among politicians precisely because it 
would ensure the possibility of maintaining national autonomy in the production of rules. 
MR foresees that the regulations of Member States may have different solutions to the 
same problem. If a product is lawfully marketed in one Member State, it may also enter the 
markets of other Member States. Schmidt (2007) indicates that significant benefits can derive, 
ranging from avoiding the costs of negotiation for harmonization, to avoiding the costs of 
adapting different national standards. However, the same author notes that MR nevertheless 
entails a transfer of sovereignty, even if not vertical, i.e., a supranational authority, but 
horizontal, since it requires accepting the consequences, for example, on the level of 
regulations, on the free circulation of products in their country that meet different regulations. 
The most important consequence for our purposes, and as we shall see in the case of 
MERCOSUR, is that MR requires a high level of confidence in the ability of other countries to 
regulate and control their own enterprises. From this point of view, Schmidt (2007) notes that 
MR is a mechanism to integrate very demanding markets. The practical difficulties of 
implementing it and the problems that may arise ex post are in contrast with the apparent ease of 
its governance. Consider the management of mutual trust between governments, or the ability to 
create incentives, once the free movement of products is ensured, for lowering the level of 
regulation in a country with the intent to promote the competitiveness of its enterprises. In other 
words, the risk of a “race to the bottom” often feared in the international system.  
The research conducted on MR in the Journal of European Public Policy’s special issue 
indicates the characteristics summarized by Schmidt in the introductory article (2007:675): 
(1) Mutual recognition is bound to work differently in different policy fields – making it 
more acceptable in one compared to the other;  
(2) Mutual recognition will have different implications for different people and different 
geographical areas;  
(3) Mutual recognition is generally applied in a restricted way, mediating its consequences; 
and  
(4) For an assessment of mutual recognition, a dynamic perspective is needed, taking into 
account its longer term effects, while being aware of both the advantages and disadvantages of 
its alternatives. 
The first point recalls Abbott and Snidal’s (2001) and our previous assertion, namely, 
that an agreement on standards is easier to obtain, even if not to maintain, when coordination 
games prevail, in other words, in the case of technological or transactional interconnectivity, 
where the interest in common standards is evident, although it may be difficult to agree on 
individual standards. Much more difficult, as indeed the European experience demonstrates, is 
MR in the case of physical or political standards: consider, for instance, European immigration 
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policies. Further, points (2) and (3) indicate that MR must be managed, and therefore entails 
significant governance problems. Finally, MR can only be proposed and managed in agreements 
that have a credible lifespan for private operators and are able to provide them with adequate 
safeguards. 
These considerations lead to an inevitable conclusion: an MR agreement cannot only 
rely on market incentives but requires the existence of public and private operator networks that 
can jointly address the problem of its functioning. This recalls the assertion of Hermann-Pillath 
(2006) arguing that the cornerstone of the integration policy lays in the possibility that 
interaction in markets and in policy takes place only in the presence of networks of actors who 
have the need to communicate with each other. “This is because institutions are the necessary 
condition for any coordinated action, which are in turn embedded into language as the medium 
of communication” (Hermann-Pillath, 2006:298). In other words, the creation of a common 
market is an institutional fact based on communication between all parties involved, namely, 
networks of trading nations. 
Moreover, the history of MR governance in the EU describes this situation well.  As 
known, the EU employs two MR-based approaches: 
- The old approach based on the principle of origin and the requirement 
of equivalency that Pelkmans (2007) defines “Judicial MR”, since it moves from the assumption 
established by a European Court of Justice judgement that imposes on Member States the free 
movement of goods when the regulation objectives are “equivalent”. Of course, if there are any 
disputes on the equivalence of rules, the Court of Justice itself must intervene. 
- The new approach, in Pelkmans’ definition “Regulatory MR”, requires a European 
directive that indicates the common objective of standards and delegates to national or 
international bodies the production of the technical rules. 
Thus, in Pelkmans words (2007:702), “the New Approach is based on directives where 
the joint definition of regulatory, objectives is the heart of the matter. Once objectives are 
commonly defined, the lack of equivalence can no longer be a reason to hinder imports. The Old 
Approach (mainly developed before Cassis de Dijon), by contrast, harmonizes by attempting to 
unify almost all technical aspects of … regulation, including extremely detailed technical 
specifications, testing, approvals and certification. It violates the respect for diversity”. 
The European MR mechanism is therefore based on these two approaches, about 
existing standards, and on the aforementioned requirement of prior notification of future 
standards. Pelkmans has no doubts in considering that, without this procedure, particularly 
without the obligation of prior notification; the European internal market could not exist. 
However, to be noted for our purposes is that European internal market, while allowing 
a certain level of autonomy to Member States for the definition of standards, requires for both 
approaches the existence of a level of governance and supranational control: the old approach 
“imposes” MR through the intervention, when necessary, of the Court of Justice for verification 
of equivalence, while the new approach still requires the approval of European directives for the 
definition of common regulatory objectives. Heritier (2007) makes a similar claim: the adoption 
of MR depends on an “activist court and on well-developed implementation rules”.  
Another assertion of Pelkmans is important for our purposes of comparison: in 
considering the benefits and costs of MR, the author points out the many difficulties in the 
practical management of the principle. Above all, information and transaction costs: businesses 
are not sufficiently informed on the possibility of using MR, the costs of obtaining this 
information, and when needed the intervention of the Community institutions, can be very high, 
and therefore particularly small and medium-sized enterprises tend to refrain from exporting or 
adapting to the standards of the destination country, which is precisely what MR seeks to 
avoid. Recalling again that the integration processes, including those based on mechanisms such 
as MR, must rely on networks of public and private economic operators able to communicate 
with each other and thus, amongst other things, reduce information and transaction costs.  
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In view of the complexity of the agreement and its benefits and costs, is MR importable 
to MERCOSUR when considering the limitations imposed by the basic principles of regional 
priority, territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and non-interference? 
It is evident that some important conclusions of the analysis that we have presented 
need to be kept in mind. 
First, it is questionable whether MR meets the requirements of national sovereignty and 
non-interference. We have already mentioned that MR is still a form of horizontal transfer of 
sovereignty, in the sense that a state must accept the rules defined by another state. Kerber and 
Van Den Berg (2008: 453) highlight that “Under a mutual recognition rule, the Member States 
lose their power to enact mandatory regulations for domestic markets. They are only able to 
enact mandatory regulations for domestic producers”. Therefore, “… the different preferences 
of the citizens in regard to regulations can no longer be satisfied”. 
Second, Maduro (2007) also questions the existence of a vertical transfer of 
sovereignty. This occurs, for example, when MR is constrained by some form of essential 
harmonization, or rather, when establishing a reference to international standards. If we then 
consider the role of the monitoring organizations, such as the ECJ, of note is that even where the 
body only has to determine the equivalence between national rules, it must still have power of 
enforcement and, in any case, can hardly base the decisions solely on the recognition of 
equivalence, but must refer to the final objective, namely, the creation of the common 
market. In the EU experience, this has often manifested in a transfer of jurisdiction to determine 
whether and when MR should be applied by the political process to the judicial process.  This 
role, in the case of the ECJ, was manifested precisely in the invitation to individual states to 
adapt, if necessary, their own rules to MR needs. 
Third, numerous analyses consider the relationship of MR with the problems of 
homogeneity among countries and mutual trust. It is easy to argue, as Pelkmans (2007) and 
Maduro (2007) do, that MR is a viable option when countries are homogeneous, and the 
objectives of the rules are identical, and the only problem is therefore the recognition of the 
equivalence of the rules. Such recognition could simply be awarded through judicial means and 
justifying diversity could also be relatively easy. We refer mainly to the cases of technological 
or transactional interconnectivity that we previously considered: here supranational governance 
may not be necessary, especially when there is a sufficient level of mutual trust between states. 
Much more complicated are the cases where the objectives of regulation differ, and 
homogeneity is limited. Maduro (2007) clarifies that, in these cases, a political process of 
identifying broader objectives is needed that considers not only national interests, but also all 
those in the area being integrated. The problem becomes even more complicated when MR 
entails policies under the jurisdiction of states but that influence the integration process, 
especially due to their divergences. We refer to cases that we formerly defined as physical 
externalities or policies requiring a solution through standards that do not undermine the 
integration process. Hence, the paradox that Maduro recalls: in cases of this kind, the need for 
MR of national rules is even greater, but approval and management are even more difficult due 
to the lack of homogeneity between states and insufficient mutual trust. The solution in such 
cases can only be supranational, a choice until now excluded from the MERCOSUR 
agreements. 
These indications explain why the only two experiments undertaken by MR on the rules 
and standards recognized by the OECD are that of the EU and the Australia New Zealand 
Closer Economic Agreement (ANZCERTA agreement between Australia and New Zealand. 
Both imply ‘hard’ law, which means they are fairly high up on the ladder of increasing 
integrative ambition and have been made possible by a unique and deep form of economic 
integration and some common institutional frameworks with responsibilities at a high political 
level. 
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Although the principle of mutual recognition is also employed with MRA, it is strictly 
confined to the recognition of technical competence of designated foreign bodies, in the 
exporting country, in specific product markets, to perform conformity assessments of products 
to the rules and procedures of the importing country. The latter country neither gives up nor 
adapts any safety, health, environment and consumer protection objectives, nor does it have to 
change any existing procedure for conformity assessment. 
Consequently, MERCOSUR only seeks to launch MRA; on the other hand, MRA also 
requires a form of regional governance. 
The Correia de Brito, Kauffmann, and Pelkmans (2016) OECD analysis indicates that 
the prevalence of cost benefits of MRA agreements can only be obtained in some cases. 
These benefits are mainly the reduction of transaction costs due to testing and 
certification, even if, in the case of highly regulated products (pharmaceuticals, cars, electronics, 
etc.), it is more convenient to rely on multilateral harmonization agreements, while for less 
regulated sectors, the costs of the agreement exceed the benefits. Benefits are also found in 
greater administrative efficiency, reducing the cost of inspections, and speeding up the time of 
the clearance of goods. A final important source of benefits could be given by the flow of 
knowledge and peer learning. The OCDE emphasizes that in the case of countries with lower 
technical skills, these knowledge flows can act as a “capacity building tool”. 
The costs are typically of an administrative nature, even if the main cost is also in this 
case linked to a loss of “sovereignty” in matters of regulation. In fact, the problem arises when 
there is insufficient convergence in the regulations and control mechanisms, so that the 
commitment to making the controls compatible is not credible. Joining an MRA means, in 
essence, considering the quality requirements of the partner country controls, which is only 
possible if the countries have similar preferences regarding regulation, and if their control 
institutions are sufficiently elastic. 
As can be seen, the approach to the use of MR and MRA differs greatly from that of the 
EU. 
The EU, while recognizing certain autonomy to states, “imposes” MR based on 
recourse to the Court of Justice for the verification of the “equivalence” of national rules, 
establishing common directives for the identification of the common objectives of the 
regulation. Naturally, this action is strongly supported by the search for convergence among 
member countries in terms of regulatory preferences: MR is possible because the preferences of 
individual member countries are not, and above all, tend not to be, substantially different. 
The main difference is therefore that the EU has both MR, which refers to the 
regulations (and therefore the principle of equivalence, and the supranational institutional 
instruments become fundamental to guaranteeing its application) and MRA. In the case of 
MERCOSUR, the GMC resolutions refer only to conformity assessment activities, namely, 
MRA. The rules remain, in any case, within national sovereignty both for their approval and for 
their management and implementation. In other words, mutual recognition agreements do not 
concern the rules or standards of other countries, but only the recognition, by a receiving 
country, that the conformity assessment bodies of other countries can certify the conformity of a 
product to its own rules. 
MERCOSUR is also very explicit in defending national sovereignty, as this is in its 
nature, reiterating that nothing can condition the national regulatory authorities to adopt the 
most appropriate rules to protect national targets for the protection of citizens or the 
environment. 
There is therefore a level of supranationality in the EU that is denied in MERCOSUR. 
To the contrary, it relies on the achievement of sectoral agreements, choosing not the whole 
market but only a few priority sectors (also according to national interests), for which forms of 
cooperation must be found, particularly to identify mutually acceptable standards whose respect 
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must be recognized by national bodies, and the conformity assessment bodies, whose decisions 
must be accepted by the other states based on general conditions negotiated between the parties. 
On the other hand, as indicated previously, TBTs originate from rules that express 
different preferences of countries, which may be of a cultural origin but also due to different 
levels of development and knowledge. From this point of view, it makes little sense to negotiate 
reciprocal concessions on purely technical aspects, also considering the fact that the absence of 
a supranational authority automatically pushes individual governments to disregard agreements 
in respect of interests perceived as national. One possible solution is to replace technical 
sectoral negotiations with a regional view of the problem, i.e., carrying out activities that enable 
developing a shared vision of the regulatory problem. 
Furthermore, a serious problem relates to lack of transparency. Lack of transparency 
can certainly be understood as a cost to the economy, either because uncertainty or insufficient 
understanding can lead to wrong decisions, or because transparency is the best defence against 
“capturing” agreements in favour of partisan interests. 
Ultimately, both the MR and the MRA tools are only achievable in some cases that we 
can summarize according to the OECD guidelines: 
-  There must be a strong motivation to trade in all the countries involved; 
-  Countries must not be too divergent, both in their preferences for regulation and in the 
quality of the control institutions; 
-  Making agreements is easier when differences in regulation create excessive difficulties 
in international trade. This is clearly the case of products with a global value chain, such as 
telecommunications equipment or electronic products; 
-  Regulations are guided more by scientific knowledge and national preferences; 
- They refer to areas for which sufficient mutual trust exists in the technical and 
regulatory capacities. 
These are objective situations that, in the case of MERCOSUR, can only be identified in 
some cases, mainly in the context of the trade of agricultural products. In other cases, the MRA 
path appears complicated and linked to the willingness of member countries to accept solutions 
with a high supranational content. 
In any case, a central issue is that of mutual trust between regulators and the conformity 
assessment agencies, trust that requires investments, especially in cooperation. 
 
Conclusions 
The results of the MERCOSUR common market building process by eliminating TBTs 
hide some important difficulties. 
In fact, the harmonization process, initiated in the sectors that MERCOSUR indicated as 
a priority, has led only some member countries to adopt the agreed rules, and hence indicating 
partial harmonization. Since adoption is approved at national level, there is no guarantee that 
states will maintain the rules adopted over time or contribute effectively to their 
implementation. Some seemingly positive results obtained in some commercial sectors suggest 
that harmonization was led by some more advanced and sophisticated companies, whose main 
objective was the “raising of rivals' costs”. In this way, small businesses consider both 
harmonization and MR as an instrument to increase their difficulties in accessing the market, or 
even impeding their survival. 
MERCOSUR may face many similar problems in different sectors, where 
harmonization towards ambitious common objectives can be very dangerous for companies and 
countries less able to manage the risk of the common market. 
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There are also other important difficulties with regard to technical capabilities, the 
provision of physical infrastructures, such as testing centres, the quality of governance of the 
harmonization process, and therefore also of MRA. 
The removal of TBTs through the harmonization of rules - which must take place at 
national level - and MRA are therefore still very distant from actually achieving a common 
market. Pursuing the path drawn according to the principles of MERCOSUR (rejection of the 
use of supranational solutions based on the rule of law in favour of forms of informal and 
intergovernmental cooperation and the retention of sovereignty) has therefore not allowed 
completing the construction of the common market. 
Moreover, these difficulties were widely anticipated. Interesting to note is that the same 
problems have been identified in the case of ASEAN, as the Report of the Eminent Persons 
Group (2006) states, “ASEAN’s problem is not one of lack of vision, ideas, or action plans. The 
problem is one of ensuring compliance and effective implementation. ASEAN must have a 
culture of commitment to honour and implement decisions, agreements and timelines”. Perhaps 
also in the case of MERCOSUR, Jones' (2015) suggestion holds: “... the weak 
institutionalisation of ASEAN economic cooperation is not a design flaw, nor does it reflect a 
normative preference for non-legalistic interaction, as constructivists suggest. Rather, it persists 
because it is functional for powerful interests. Open regionalism reflects and sustains a broad 
accommodation between, on the one hand, neoliberal technocrats, economists and reformist 
business interests who favour greater liberalisation and, on the other, those politico-business 
elites and other societal groups favouring protection”. 
What are the main problems and solutions? 
The MERCOSUR roadmap in this context foresees at the beginning of the process the 
harmonization of rules (and therefore not mutual recognition) through government agreements. 
This road is very long and expensive, and has some significant obstacles: 
1) In the first place, sectoral negotiations are often conditioned by the interests of the most 
advanced countries and companies, creating disparities between companies and consequently 
between states that then condition the continuation of the process. 
2) Once agreement has been reached, often after very long negotiations, the decision to adopt 
the agreed rules falls to the national states. In addition to the issue of the adoption time, here the 
problem of lack of transparency is felt: monitoring the harmonization process is often 
conditioned by a lack of information from governments, therefore rendering the evaluation of 
results difficult. 
3) MRA come into play only after agreement has been reached and the agreed rules are 
adopted at national level, and concern only the recognition of the activities of the conformity 
assessment bodies. Here the difficulties above all lie in the qualitative level of the actions of 
these technical bodies and the availability of financial and cognitive resources. 
4) The agreement results are often ambiguous, and the dispute resolution tools are lacking 
when there are conflicts over the interpretation of the rules. 
From these considerations derives the proposal for a different approach, no longer based 
on technical sectoral negotiations but on an action carried out jointly at the regional level. In 
particular, the proposal to base the harmonization on a process carried out jointly by all member 
countries would seem important. According to Yan and Cadot (2016), ASEAN proposed "The 
creation of similar bodies in all ASEAN member countries and the scope for setting up common 
training would promote the emergence of a common vision in terms of regulatory principles". 
This means overcoming a merely technical negotiation phase - and therefore easily influenced 
by the opposing interests of states and business - in favour of a regional approach that develops 
interest for the emergence of a common culture of good regulation. 
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This, however, would require fostering the involvement of businesses and the creation 
of a common interest in regulation and accentuating mutual trust among companies and 
governments. 
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